Remote Infrastructure Security Operator
Operating infrastructure security through strict control-plane separation and verifiable trust.
Role
I operate infrastructure security remotely without delegating trust to external proxies, managed gateways, or opaque security services.
Operating Model
- Management access is allowed only from a dedicated management network
- Control plane and service plane are strictly separated
- All administrative actions are forced through a single access path
- Keys, accounts, privileges, and logs are separated by role
- Every change is auditable and reversible
Scope of Work
- Bastion-style control plane design and operation
- Linux host hardening with minimal and reviewable changes
- DNSSEC, DANE, and TLS trust chain maintenance
- Incident response based on predefined runbooks
- Blast-radius reduction through enforced access paths
Core Architecture
The foundation of this operating model is strict control-plane separation, even when management and service workloads share the same physical server.
Reference Implementation
All operational artifacts, runbooks, and baselines are publicly documented.